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MAKING THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
RELEVANT TO THE NEW DEMOGRAPHICS OF
AMERICA: A RESPONSE TO FARRELL AND
JOHNSON*
LEO F. ESTRADA"
Professor Estrada responds to what he views as the three themes
of Professor Farrell and Professor Johnson's Principal Article.
Estrada argues that the demographic trends that affect political
representation are more complex than Farrell and Johnson
describe. Estrada begins with a discussion of changing
demographics and inter-group conflict, particularly between
Latinos, Blacks, and Asians, and discusses the potential political
ramifications for these minority groups in the new demography
evidenced by the 2000 census. After discussing majority-minority
districts, Estrada focuses on the disenfranchisement of Latino and
Asian voters and the use of demographic data in the construction
of representative districts as it relates to the Latino population. He
concludes with an examination of issues presented by the 2000
census demographic data, the solutions posed by Farrell and
Johnson, and future ramifications for the Voting Rights Act.
INTRODUCTION
Redistricting is the process of restructuring political space, and
demographic change is the basic element of that process. At the
national level, population size is the only factor determining
apportionment process-each state's share of seats in the House of
Representatives.' Within a state, when populations grow above the
average, districts must contract to decrease their populations. When
* Presented at the Symposium, Democracy in New America, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, North Carolina Law Review, Feb. 17,2001.
** Associate Professor of Urban Planning, School of Public Policy and Social
Research, University of California, Los Angeles.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2. "The decennial reapportionment of the United
States House of Representatives is carried out in accordance with a statutory formula,
called the 'method of equal proportions,' established in 1941." Peter S. Wattson, How to
Draw Redistricting Plans that Will Stand Up in Court, Address before the National
Conference of State Legislators 1 (Nov. 7, 1999) (citing 2 U.S.C. §§ 2a, 2b (1994)).
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populations decline below the average, districts must expand to
increase their populations. Within a district, changes in the
population's composition can determine whether it becomes a more
diverse or a more homogeneous district. When the mix of
populations provides for a sufficient number of minority voters in a
district, those voters will have a high probability of electing a
candidate of their choice.
In their paper on the new demography, Farrell and Johnson
acknowledge the significance of demographic change in advancing the
political participation of America's minority groups2 The authors
focus on three important themes: (1) changing demographics and
increasing inter-group tensions, (2) creation of majority-minority
congressional districts, and (3) factors that continue to disenfranchise
minority voters. The demographic trends affecting political
representation is more complex than portrayed by the authors as
described in the following sections.
CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS
Farrell and Johnson begin with a discussion on demographic
growth in America.3  In fact, the United States is the only
technologically advanced and industrially modernized country in the
world that is growing in population.4 Other nations such as France,
Japan, Italy, Germany, and Russia, among others, are experiencing
negative growth.5 The United States experiences growth when other
countries do not because net immigration accounts for about forty
percent of the nation's growth.6 The remaining growth is due to
natural increase (births minus deaths).7 The continued growth of the
United States, coupled with differential growth of minority
populations, continually changes the mosaic we call America.
A major theme of the Farrell-Johnson paper is that inter-group
competition for political power is inevitable based largely on
2. Walter C. Farrell, Jr. & James H. Johnson, Jr., Minority Political Participation in
the New Millennium: The New Demographics and the Voting Rights Act, 79 N.C. L. REV.
1215, 1217-19 (2001).
3. Id. at 1218 (stating that the United States will experience continued population
growth substantially above replacement rates).
4. Population Reference Bureau, World Population Data Sheet: Demographic Data
and Estimates for the Countries and Regions of the World, June 2000, at 2-9.
5. Id. at 7-8.
6. See NPG, Fast Facts About U.S. Population Growth, at
http://www.npg.orglfacts/uspopfax.htm (listing population statistics for the United States)
(last visited Sep. 13,2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
7. See id.
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demographic change. The authors then move from their discussion of
growth to a discussion of the increased inter-minority tensions that
have arisen due to these demographic changes.8 Demographic change
in itself does not automatically lead to tensions without certain
conditions that the authors fail to discuss. For example, for the
purposes of redistricting, trends in demographic growth among
minority populations may not be as important as trends in geographic
concentration and geographic dispersal. Latino growth has been
characterized by geographic concentration of newcomers even as
longer-term residents suburbanize.9 Given their numbers, Latino
dispersion has often resulted in re-concentration in suburban areas,
creating new suburban ethnic enclaves or "barrios." Asian growth is
a combination of subgroup concentration, as in the case of
Vietnamese and Koreans, and subgroup dispersion, as in the case of
Filipinos and Japanese.10 By contrast, since the 1980s, African
Americans have experienced extensive intra-metropolitan movement
away from the inner city." Ironically, as suburban residential
opportunities for African Americans have increased, their political
impact on elections in traditional African-American districts has
decreased. These intra-metropolitan changes have important
consequences since the redistricting process typically rewards growth
and concentrated populations.
INTER-GROUP TENSION
Farrell and Johnson provide survey evidence from Los Angeles,
California of inter-group tensions based primarily on inter-group
perceptions that lead to inter-group antagonisms. 2  Inter-group
tensions are not new. They occur in all communities that undergo
transition and succession by a new group.'3  Tensions based on
8. See Farrell & Johnson, supra note 2, at 1219.
9. Vilma Ortiz, The Mexican-Origin Population: Permanent Working Class or
Emerging Middle Class, in ETHNIC Los ANGELES 266-270 (Roger Waldinger & Mehdi
Bozorgmehr eds., 1996).
10. Lucie Cheng & Philip Q. Yang, Asians: The "Model Minority" Deconstructed, in
ETHNIC Los ANGELES, supra note 9, at 334-39.
11. David M. Grant et al., African Americans: Social and Economic Bifurcation, in
ETHNIC LOS ANGELES, supra note 9, at 400.
12. See Farrell & Johnson, supra note 2, at 1219-22,1248-49.
13. See CHANDLER DAVIDSON, RACE AND CLASS IN TEXAS POLITICS (1990);
Melvin L. Oliver & James H. Johnson, Jr., Inter-Ethnic Conflict in an Urban Ghetto: The
Case of Blacks and Latinos in Los Angeles, in 6 RESEARCH IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS,
CONFLICTS AND CHANGE 57 (Richard Ratcliff ed., 1984); see also PETER K. EISINGER,
THE POLITICS OF DISPLACEMENT: RACIAL AND ETHNIC TRANSITION IN THREE
AMERICAN CITIES (1980); RAPHAEL J. SONENSHEIN, POLITICS IN BLACK AND WHITE:
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misperceptions and stereotypes are significant in the discussion of
elections when people act on those perceptions, for example, by
voting against candidates solely due to their group membership. Bloc
voting studies "have documented white bloc voting against African
Americans and Latinos.14 I am not aware of any evidence, however,
of bloc voting by Latinos against African Americans or vice versa.
In assessing inter-minority tension between Latinos and Blacks,
the authors err by using one strident editorial as being representative
of Latino attitudes toward African Americans. 5 Latino perceptions
are too complex to be summarized by a writer speaking as an
individual and not on behalf of a Latino constituency.
In the end, Latino growth will outpace that of African Americans
in most parts of the United States, and, at least in the near future,
Latinos will remain geographically concentrated. 6 Thus, it is
inevitable that Latino electoral representation will increase.
Although the Latino and African-American populations are of
approximately equal size, African Americans have twice the
representation in Congress. African Americans with a population of
thirty-five million have thirty-eight congressional representatives.
By contrast, thirty-five million Latinos have nineteen congressional
representatives and have ample opportunities to increase their
representation as their voter base continues to grow. The most
important question then is how will greater Latino electoral
representation be achieved. Will it be achieved at the expense of
African Americans or at the expense of white progressive elected
officials?
The authors list ten congressional districts currently held by
African Americans with substantial and growing Latino populations. 9
RACE AND POWER IN Los ANGELES (1993).
14. BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST
FOR VOTING EQUALITY 70-73 (1992).
15. See Farrell & Johnson, supra note 2, at 1223 (citing Jack Miles, Blacks vs. Browns,
THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 1992, at 51).
16. Leo Estrada, The Hispanic Population of the United States: A First Look at the
New Millennium, HISPANICS TODAY, 2001, at 2.
17. See Members of the Congressional Black Caucus, 107th Congress, at http://
www.house.gov/ebjohnson/cbcmembers4.htm (listing the members of the Congressional
Black Caucus) (last visited on Sept. 12, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); J.C. Watts, Jr., at http://www.house.gov/watts (providing information on the lone
Black Congressman who is not a member of the Congressional Black Caucus) (last visited
on Sept. 12,2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
18. NALEO EDUCATION FUND, 2000 NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF LATINO ELECTED
OFFICIALS (2001).
19. See Farrell & Johnson, supra note 2, at 1250.
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The implication that future African-American losses will come
primarily from challenges by Latinos seems fully off the mark. For
example, in California the loss of African-American representation
has not come at the hands of Latinos. In fact, Kevin Shelley, a white
male, succeeded assemblyman Willie Brown (now Mayor of San
Francisco). 2 A white male, Don Peralta, now holds the State Senate
seat formerly held by African-American Barbara Lee.2' An Asian
female, Wilma Chan, now represents the Assembly seat formerly held
by African-American Elijhu Harris. A white male, Dick Floyd,
holds the Assembly seat formerly held by now Congresswoman
Juanita McDonaldP The Oakland mayoralty seat formerly held by
an African American, Lionel Wilson, is now held by former Governor
Jerry Brown,24 and any challenge to Congresswoman Barbara Lee
will probably come from a white male, Don Peralta. 5 In sum, the
20. 1996 GENERAL ELECTION RETURNS FOR CALIFORNIA STATE ASSEMBLY,
District 12, http:llvote96.ss.ca.govlVote96/htmllvote/assyMl2.961218083
52 8.html (last
visited Sept. 17,2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
21. 1996 GENERAL ELECTION RETURNS FOR CALIFORNIA STATE ASSEMBLY,
District 9, http:llvote96.ss.ca.govlVote96/html/votelassyMO9.96121808
352 8.html (last
visited Sept. 17,2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
22. African Americans lost this district in 1996 to Don Perata. 1996 GENERAL
ELECTION RETURNS FOR CALIFORNIA STATE ASSEMBLY, District 16,
http:/lvote96.ss.ca.govlVote96/htmllvote/assyMl6.961218083528.html (last visited Sept.
17, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). It then passed to Audie Bock, a
white woman, in 1998, and finally to Wilma Chan in 2000. See CALIFORNIA SECRETARY
OF STATE-VOTE98, State Assembly District 16, http:llvote98.ss.ca.govlRetums/stasml
1600.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review);
Member of the State Assembly, http:llwww.ss.ca.gov/electionslsov/2000-generall
assemb.pdf (last visited Sept. 17,2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
23. 1996 GENERAL ELECTION RETURNS FOR CALIFORNIA STATE ASSEMBLY,
District 55, http://vote96.ss.ca.govlVote96/htmllvote/assyM55.961218083
528 .html (last
visited Sept. 17, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). After Rep. Floyd
was termed-out, the seat was won by a Latina, Jenny Oropeza in 2000. Member of the
State Assembly, http://www.ss.ca.govlelections/sovl2OOOgenerallassemb.pdf (last visited
Sept. 17,2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
24. County of Alameda, California, Oakland Mayor, http://www.co.alameda.ca.us/rovl
v984/ROVE971032.HTML (last visited Sept. 17, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
25. Peralta's State Senate District encompasses Rep. Barbara Lee's Congressional
District. Congressional District 30 (Berman) was 53% Latino in 1990 and 65% Latino in
2000. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Selected Characteristics of Persons by Race and Hispanic
Origin: 1990, at 167-68, at http:llwww.census.gov/prodll/90declcph4/tables/cph4tb0
6/
table-17.pdf (last visited on Sept. 17, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
Congressional District 20 (Dooley) was 56% Latino in 1990 and 64% Latino in 2000. U.S.
Bureau of the Census, Selected Characteristics of Persons by Race and Hispanic Origin:
1990, at 157-58, at http:lwww.census.gov/prodll/90declcph4/tables/cph4tbO6/table-17.pdf
(last visited on Sept. 17, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
Congressional District 50 (Filner) was 41% Latino in 1990 and 51% Latino in 2000. U.S.
Bureau of the Census, Selected Characteristics of Persons by Race and Hispanic Origin:
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losses of African-American representation in California have come at
the hands of primarily white (and in one case Asian) progressives,
rather than Latinos, as Farrell and Johnson concluded.
The California congressional seats most likely to be challenged
by Latinos in California are those currently held by white, male
Democrats: Calvin Dooley (in the Central Valley), Howard Berman
(in the San Fernando Valley), and Bob Filner (in San Diego). Each
of these congressional seats is already located in a majority Latino
population district.
Is competition for political office inevitable between African
Americans and Latinos? The answer, I think, is possibly "yes," but
the result need not be conflictive. In fact, there are numerous
instances of election collaboration between minority groups.26
Stephen Erie has noted that Asians and Latinos have coalesced
around bilingual education. 27 Latinos and African Americans have
also coalesced to fight against police brutality.28
1990, at 187-88, at http://www.census.gov/prodll/90dec/Cph4/tableslcph4tbO6/table-17.pdf
(last visited on Sept. 17, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The 2000
census figures above are calculated with the current 1990 lines. The 2001 redistricting
process can lower or increase the proportion of Latinos in those congressional districts.
26. STEVEN P. ERIE ET AL., PATHS TO POLITICAL INCORPORATION FOR LATINOS
AND ASIAN PACIFICS IN CALIFORNIA 30-32 (1993). Current examples of inter-racial
cooperative and coalition efforts in California exist: (1) The Assembly seat held by
Antonio Villaraigosa had been held by Latino elected officials since it was created in the
1990 redistricting. Upon being termed out, Villaraigosa endorsed an openly gay, white
woman, Jackie Goldberg, who represented the area in the Los Angeles City Council. This
was an unprecedented action since the expectation was that he would endorse a Latino or
Latina to succeed him. With Villaraigosa's endorsement, Goldberg won against two
Latino opponents. Ted Rohrlich, Goldberg to Enter Race to Replace Villariagosa, L.A.
TIMES, May 14,1999, at B4. (2) A Latina State Assemblywoman, Gloria Romero, decided
to run for the State Senate. She endorsed an Asian woman, and Monterrey Park City
Councilwoman, for her "Latina" district. The Asian, Judy Chu, won against a Latino
opponent. Frank del Olmo, Commentary: Turning the Ethnic Factor on its Head, L.A.
TIMES, May 20, 2001, at M5. (3) The 37th Congressional District has increasingly become
more Latino. In 2000, this district was 57% Latino, yet no Latino candidates challenged
the current African American Representative, Juanita Millender-McDonald. She won
against several African American opponents. Member of the State Assembly,
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/sov/2000-generallassemb.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2001)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review). (4) In preparation for the 2000
redistricting process, three major organizations representing Latinos (Mexican American
Legal Defense and Education Fund), African Americans (NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund), and Asians (National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium) joined
to create a "unity plan" to protect current section 2 districts, minority incumbents, and
against the fragmentation of community of interests. See THE IMPACT OF REDISTRICTING
IN YOUR COMMUNITY: A GUIDE FOR REDISTRICTING 6 (2001).
27. Asians and Latinos coalesce around Prop 227. See STEVEN P. ERIE ET AL., supra
note 26, at 30-32.
28. Blacks and Latinos coalesce around Rodney King, LAPD. See Emily Adams &
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MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICTS
Farrell and Johnson present an interesting discussion on the
benefits and liabilities in creating minority-majority districts. I wish
they had expanded this discussion to include the role that majority-
minority districts play in the political arena and to discuss the role for
near majority districts like those suggested by Swain, or influence
districts.29 This is an important discussion because it is generally
assumed that the reduction of majority-minority districts will reduce
minority representation. Associating the decline in majority-minority
districts with declining minority representation does not reflect the
dynamics observed in different minority populations, however. For
example, Latinos, but particularly Latinas, have demonstrated their
ability to win elections in non-Latino districts more so than other
ethnic groups.3 ° Latinos in California for example, increased their
Frank B. Williams, Protest Over Police Beating Continues, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1994, at
B1.
29. Carol Swain, The Supreme Court's Rulings on Congressional Districts Could
Benefit Minority Voters, in BLACK FACES, BLACK INTEREST: THE REPRESENTATION OF
AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CONGRESS (1995). Swain makes a compelling argument for
"near majority districts," also know as "influence districts," because they are less likely to
pack minority voters and also likely to influence the political stance of candidates
regardless of the race of the candidate. Farrell and Johnson missed the opportunity to
discuss the present and future implications of representation for African Americans.
30. The electoral evidence in California shows that Latina women are more likely to
attract crossover votes. As the following list of successful Latina candidates and the
proportion of Latino registered voters indicate, they were elected by attracting the vote of
non-Latinos: Senator Lez Figueroa (14% Latino registration), Senator Deborah Ortiz
(9% Latino registration), Senator Nell Soto (29% Latino registration), Former
Assemblywoman Denise Ducheney, (37% Latino registration), Assemblywoman Gloria
McLeod (27% Latino registration), Assemblywoman Jenny Oropeza (23% Latino
registration), Assemblywoman Sally Havice (18% registration), Charlene Zettel (6%
Latino registration). See Member of the State Assembly, http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/
sov/2000.general/assemb.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review); CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE, CALIFORNIA CONGRESSIONAL
CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION PROPOSED DISTRICTS, http://www.sen.ca.gov/ftp/senl
cngplanlnewtextdocument.htp (last updated Sept. 12, 2001) (providing links to
demographic data for the fifty-three proposed state senate districts) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review); CALIFORNIA STATE ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON
ELECTIONS, REAPPORTIONMENT, AND CONsTrTUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, http://
www.assembly.ca.gov/committee/c7/asmfinallnewtextdocument.html (Sept. 13, 2001)
(providing links to demographic data for the fifty-three proposed state assembly districts)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA STATE
ASSEMBLY]. A similar pattern exists for successful Asian women candidates:
Assemblywoman Wilma Chan (6% Asian registration), Assemblywoman Carol Liu (6%
Asian registration), and Assemblywoman Judy Chu (19% Asian registration). See
Member of the State Assembly, supra; CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE, supra; CALIFORNIA
STATE ASSEMBLY, supra. The role of gender in attracting non-minority crossover votes
has not been given the attention it deserves given this body of evidence.
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representation in the State Assembly from four in 1991 to twenty in
1999.31 Also, Latino representation in the State Senate increased
from three in 1991 to seven in 1999.32 Likewise, Asian Americans
increased their representation in the State Assembly from zero in
1991 to three in 1999.13 These increases are somewhat related to the
1990 redistricting process that created some majority-minority seats,
but primarily are due to the creation of competitive seats with strong
minority influence over the election results.
THE USE OF RACE IN REDISTRICTING
In this post Shaw v. Reno34 era, the approach to redistricting must
reflect these new demographic realities and legal limitations 5.3  The
authors argue for non-racial approaches to redistricting.36 I do not
agree that the post-Shaw era calls for totally ignoring the use of race
in favor of non-racial approaches. The use of race to create majority-
minority districts is consistent with Justice O'Connor's guiding
commentary in Bush v. Vera:37
Today's decisions in conjunction with the recognition of the
compelling state interest in compliance with the reasonably
perceived requirement of Section 2, present a workable
framework for the achievement of these twin goals. I would
summarize that framework, and the rules governing the
States' consideration of race in the districting process as
follows. First, so long as they do not subordinate traditional
districting criteria to the use of race for its own sake or as a
proxy, States may intentionally create majority-minority
31. News Release, NALEO News, Latinos Grab Seats in State Houses Nationwide
(Nov. 9,2000), available at http://www.naleo.org/PressReleases/latinosgrab.htm.
32. California Journal, Roster and Government Guide, 1992 and 2000.
33. 1d; AsianWeek.com, How Asian American Candidates Fared& Results for Races in
San Francisco, California and Nationwide, Nov. 10-16, 2000, at http://www.asianweek.com/
2000_11_10/feature8_allresults.html#assembly (listing the results of California State
Senate and Assembly races with Asian-American candidates) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
34. 509 U.S. 630 (1993), on remand sub nom, Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (1994),
rev'd, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
35. Id.; Wattson, supra note 1. Mr. Wattson lists the following guidelines: (1) You
may consider race in drawing districts; (2) Avoid drawing a racial gerrymander; (2a)
Beware of bizarre shapes; (2b) Draw districts that are reasonably compact; (2c) Beware of
making race your dominant motive; (2d) Beware of using race as a proxy for political
affiliation; (2e) Follow traditional redistricting principles. Id.
36. See Farrell & Johnson, supra note 2, at 1232-36 ("First, in constructing
congressional and other political districts, the emphasis, given the conservative legal
realities, should be on the commonality of interests among district residents rather that on
the commonality of race.").
37. 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
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districts and may otherwise take race into consideration,
without coming under strict scrutiny. Only if traditional
districting criteria are neglected and that neglect is
predominately due to the misuse of race does strict scrutiny
apply."
In sum, the section 2 Voting Rights Act (VRA) test can co-exist in
principle and in practice with Shaw v. Reno. 9
COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST
The authors also begin to provide a useful framework to define
that legally nebulous term, "community of interest."'  I generally
agree that commonality of interests can be measured around the
following five elements: (1) Geographic, including topology, land use,
political boundaries and other physical landscape features; (2)
Economic, including common socioeconomic indicators such as per
capita income, home ownership, and poverty; (3) Behavioral,
including community actions such as voting behavior, political
affiliation, commuting, and use of public transit; (4) Cultural,
including immigration, language, race and ethnicity, and landmarks;
and (5) Place attachment, including identification with the area and its
institutions.
38. Id. at 933 (O'Connor. J., concurring) (citations omitted).
39. What appears at first glance to be a contradiction, section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act requires that one consider race, for example, in determining retrogression while Shaw
v. Reno cautions against the use of race solely as the basis and motive for redistricting. 509
U.S. 630, 656 (1993). Justice O'Connor recognizes this dilemma and speaks to the notion
of balance. Id
40. See Farrell & Johnson, supra note 2, at 1233-36.
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 protects voters from any election
procedures, including the redistricting process that deprive them of an effective vote
because of their race. In the redistricting process, racial and linguistic minority voters
must be protected from efforts to reduce minority voters from having less of a chance to
elect the candidates of their choice. The only way to determine minority voter dilution is
by using racial and ethnic data. Shaw v. Reno suggests that the redistricting process must
primarily be based on traditional redisticting criteria and not rely primarily on
racial/ethnic data. At first glance these two appear to be contradictory. O'Connor's
language balances the two viewpoints and provides a guidepost for the proper role of
racial and ethnic data in the redisticting process.
The concept of "communities of interest" is among the traditional redisticting
criteria. However, this concept has remained vaguely defined even as its importance has
increased as a basis for redistricting. Farrell and Johnson provide a useful foundation for
unraveling elements of commonality. I have added an additional component, place
attachment, to their list to elaborate on still another common element for "communities of
interest."
The first four components of community of interest listed are quantifiable and
measurable. The final component is anecdotal and based on local community member
testimony.
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DISENFRANCHISEMENT
The authors eloquently discuss the disenfranchisement of voters,
a topic that has been largely muted in recent years until the Florida
debacle.4' The outcome of the litigation surrounding the 2000 Florida
vote for presidential candidates diminished the intent of the Voting
Rights Act and the ideal that all voters have an equal voice in election
outcomes. The Florida election brought to the surface the fact that
battles over the right to vote, long considered fought and won, are
still underway. Finally, while minority electoral empowerment has
typically focused on voter registration, voter education, and get out
the vote efforts, the Florida experience demonstrates that equal
attention has to be given to monitoring disparities in balloting and
mechanisms for counting ballots. The right to vote is a process that
does not end when the vote is cast but extends to the decision about
which votes are valid and counted.
Without taking away from the national significance of the
unequal conditions of voting that affected the Florida minority vote in
the last election, which the authors covered well, I would like to focus
on other forms of disenfranchisement that affect Latinos and Asians,
in particular.
CITIZEN VOTING AGE POPULATION
One form of disenfranchisement is the reliance on citizen voting
age population (CVAP) as the criterion for section 2 voting districts.
While total population represents all the constituents, and voting age
population (VAP) represents the adult voter potential, citizen voting
age population (CVAP) represents eligible potential voters (omitting
non-citizens).42  According to the 1990 census data, in California,
thirty-eight percent of the adult Latino population and twenty-seven
percent of the adult Asian population are foreign born and non-
citizens compared to twelve percent for Whites, and eight percent for
Blacks.43
41. Id at 1337-42.
42. Voting Age Population (VAP) includes all persons 18 years and older. VAP is
typically used as the denominator in calculating voter registration (Registered Voters are
divided by Voting Age Population and multiplied by one hundred: Voters
Registered/VAP * 100). Citizen Voter Age Population (CVAP) omits adults who are not
U.S. citizens. The use of CVAP as the denominator for Voter Registration results in a
more accurate assessment of voter potential for Latinos and Asians because it omits non-
eligible adults. When you divide the smaller denominator into the total registered voters,
the smaller denominator (CVAP) results in lowering the proportion of Latino (or Asian)
voters.
43. In California, approximately seven percent of African-American adults are
1292 [Vol. 79
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Recently, the courts have insisted that the "ability to elect"
required a majority CVAP for Latino districts. 4  This criterion
disproportionately affects the Latino and Asian populations. While
total population is used in the redistricting process, the courts have
moved toward the criteria of "CVAP" to determine electability.
Thus, a Latino majority district is not "accepted" by the courts as a
viable district until it can be shown that the Latino CVAP represents
fifty percent or more of the district. This criteria is not considered for
other groups, such as African Americans, and affects Latinos and
Asians because high proportions of their populations are non-citizens.
Using the CVAP criteria results in the "packing" of Latino districts to
attain the required majority CVAP levels. It is also the reason that
the more dispersed Asian community will never have a majority
CVAP district in California. Meeting the majority requirement,
however, forces districts to be drawn with an over-concentration of
Latinos beyond what Latinos actually need to win a district. In
general, Latinos and Asians are capable of winning strong influence
districts without having majority CVAP districts, yet are bound by the
law to create such districts.45 This is forced upon the redistricting
process despite the fact that there are many examples of Latino
electoral wins where Latino voter registration approaches a
percentage in the mid-thirties.46 Latinos in California, for example
hold fifteen seats in the State Assembly where Latino registration is
foreign born compared to thirty-eight percent for Latino adults and twenty-seven percent
for Asian adults. About three percent of white adults are foreign born. U.S. Bureau of
the Census, Current Population Reports p-25-1130, GPO (1996).
44. Majority CVAP has been established as the standard for the "ability to elect" by
the Seventh and Fifth Circuits. See Citizenship and the Bright Line 50% Requirement of
Valdespino Create a High Hurdle for Section 2 Plaintiffs in the Future, in AVOIDING A
CHALLENGE UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECrION CLAUSE AS INTERPRETED BY SHAW V.
RENO, MILLER V. JOHNSON, AND BUSH V. VERA 11 (Douglas E. Markham ed., 1999).
45. In California, the majority of Latino districts and all of the Asian districts have
been won with less than fifty percent CVAP. See University of California, Berkeley,
Institute for Governmental Studies, Statewide Database, Data Summaries by Assembly
District Census Information: Voting Age Hispanic Origin and Race by AD, available at
http:llswdb.berkeley.edulinfo/censuslad/votehisp.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2001) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Voting Age Hispanic]; University of
California, Berkeley, Institute for Governmental Studies, Statewide Database, Data
Summaries by Assembly District Census Information: Hispanic Origin and Race by AD,
available at http:llswdb.berkeley.edulinfo/censusladlhisp.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2001)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Hispanic Origin]; Member of
State Assembly, supra note 30.
46. In California, Latino candidates have won in nine districts with CVAP below
thirty percent. See Voting Age Hispanic, supra note 45; Hispanic Origin, supra note 45;
Member of State Assembly, supra note 30.
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between twenty-one percent and thirty-six percent.4 7 This translates
roughly into twenty-six percent to forty-three percent CVAP.
Latinos win these strong influence districts for several reasons:
Latino growth in the district during the decade, term limits that
overcome incumbent advantages, candidate recruitment and election
funding, and developing coalitions that overcome polarized voting.
To make matters worse, Public Law 94-17148 requires the U.S.
Census Bureau to provide a datatape to all states for the purpose of
redistricting and specifies that the data will include population,
population by race and ethnicity, and population 18+ and population
18+ by race and ethnicity. However, this redistricting data does not
include citizenship data and therefore redistricting must proceed both
without this information and with the understanding that a Latino
minority-majority district can be challenged if it fails to meet the
majority CVAP threshold.4 9 Also, CVAP is locked in time and can
only be measured for small geographic areas once in a decade."
Unlike voter turnout that can be measured with each election, CVAP
is a snapshot calculated using the decennial census data on the
number of citizens eligible to vote. 1 This data is, by definition,
anchored to the decennial year. Thus, changes in CVAP over the
decade can only be estimated while voter turnout can be re-calculated
with accuracy during each election. For the most part, one must
47. In 2002 in California, four Latino officeholders won in districts where Latino voter
registration is less than fifteen percent; six Latino officeholders won in districts with
Latino voter registration from fifteen to twenty-five percent; four Latino officeholders
won in districts with Latino voter registration from twenty-six to thirty-five percent; and
eight Latino officeholders won in districts with Latino voter registration from thirty-six to
forty-five percent. See Voting Age Hispanic, supra note 45; Hispanic Origin, supra note
45; Member of State Assembly, supra note 30.
48. This law provides that the U.S. Bureau of the Census will provide redistricting
data to all states one year after the decennial census. The law specifies the data to be
provided. Act of Dec. 23, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-171, 89 Stat. 1023 (codified as amended at
13 U.S.C. § 141(c) (1994)).
49. Citizenship data from the Census Bureau will become available in late summer to
early fall, 2001-late into the redistricting process. Latino majority districts established as
section 2 districts may be challenged later for failing to meet the majority CVAP standard
despite the lack of such data during the redistricting process.
50. Citizenship data for small areas, like census tracts, is obtained from the long form
of the decennial census. The census provides information on both those who report being
born in the United States as well as those who are citizens through naturalization. These
two categories combined represent eligible citizens. This information is available once
every decade and anchored to the census year, for example, 1990,2000, or other year.
51. CVAP is calculated by dividing the number of eligible citizens into the number of
Spanish surnamed voters. Spanish surnamed voters are determined by matching a list of
the most common Spanish surnames against the voter registration list. Unlike the
information on citizenship, Spanish surname voter registration can be updated during the
decade.
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assume no change in the rate of citizen eligibility throughout the
decade despite the evidence to the contrary from the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) naturalization data. 2
Finally, the use of CVAP criteria disenfranchises legal residents
who are in the process of naturalization. In areas of high immigration
with large numbers of legal residents seeking naturalization, the use
of CVAP is overly narrow. Rather, it is arguable that CVAP and the
number of legal residents seeking naturalization combined represent
the appropriate eligible population rather than CVAP alone.
Through no fault of their own, a couple of million legal residents
seeking a change in their immigration status are backlogged in the
INS bureaucracy. 3 This slow process can be considered a "practice"
preventing eligible individuals from attaining citizenship.
Furthermore, the current naturalization fee of $225 can be considered
a "poll tax" preventing legal residents from citizenship and voting
privileges. 4
DEMOGRAPHY: FOR OR AGAINST?
As indicated earlier in the paper, demographic data plays a
significant role in the redistricting process. Census produced
population data is the official information used by all states for the
purpose of redistricting. As our nation has become more
52. As indicated above, the citizenship data is anchored to the year 2000 and will not
be updated during the decade. According to the INS, from 1991 to 1997, 1.3 million
applicants asked for a legal residence under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK
OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 1998, at 28 (2001) [hereinafter
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK]. Over the same period, more than one hundred thousand
Cubans entered as refugees. I& at 115. During the same period, 1.4 million legal
immigrants entered as family sponsored immigrants. Id at 28. For all of the categories,
after five years of continuous residence, legal residents may apply for citizenship following
a civics test, health screening, and finger print review by law enforcement. U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, GUIDE TO NATURALIZATION, 22-24,
26, 36-39 (1999). Given the magnitude of these numbers, it should be obvious that the
citizenship figures will change over the next decade.
53. Between 1991 and 1998, 6.2 million persons applied for naturalization.
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 52, at 172. Over that period of time, approximately
3.9 million persons were naturalized. Id. The remaining 2.5 million persons represent the
current "backlog." See id.; Audrey Singer, U.S. Citizenship Applications at All Time High,
in POPULATION TODAY 4-5 (2000).
54. Applicants must pay a fee to the INS to submit applications for processing.
Immigration and Naturalization Service Fees, 8 C.F.R. § 103.7 (2001). The current fee is
$225, but INS is considering raising it in the near future. IdL; Adjustment of Certain Fees
of the Immigration Examinations Fee Account, 66 Fed. Reg. 41,456 (Aug. 8, 2001).
Reform of the INS naturalization process is a significant civil rights issue for both Latinos
and Asians.
1295
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
demographically complex, demographic analysis will be used to argue
on behalf as well as against voting rights. As an expert witness in a
recent voting rights challenge to at-large elections, I can list several
illustrations of challenges based on the demographic dynamics of the
Latino population:55
A) Census data on citizenship for Latinos are overestimated.
This is a significant challenge for calculating electability of a
candidate of choice.5 7 This allegation is based on the large
share of undocumented population of Latinos in the U.S.
who presumably would not report their "true" immigration
status. Indirect evidence of over-reporting uses residual
methods .5  But there is no direct evidence of misreporting of
citizenship.
B) Disparities in socio-economic status between Latinos and
non-Latinos are exaggerated by the high proportion of
immigrants in the Latino population.5 9 Establishing socio-
economic differences is important to establish Latinos as a
distinct group. In response, the argument is made that
overall differences in SES are important, but additional
analysis controlling for the effects of immigration are also
appropriate.
C) Low Latino voter participation is due to eligible voters with
no prior voting traditions in their countries of origin.' This
is a "blame the victim" strategy based on anecdotal evidence.
In response, evidence is provided that voter turnout does not
differ between groups.
61
55. See, e.g., Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria, 160 F. Supp. 543 (9th Cir. 1998).
56. Peter A. Morrison, Supplemental Report on Santa Maria, Expert Report prepared
for Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria (Mar. 14, 1994). Morrison states, "misreporting of
citizenship is a scientifically documented reality, and its occurrence is most pervasive
among recently arrived non-citizen immigrants." Id
57. Id. It follows that if citizenship is over-reported, then calculations based on
CVAP are over-estimated.
58. The limitations of residual methods are noted in, Leo F. Estrada, Supplemental
Report No. 2, Expert report prepared in Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria (Mar. 17,1994).
59. Peter A. Morrison, Report for Trial on City of Santa Maria, Expert Report
prepared for Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria 5, (Mar. 13, 2000) (stating that the continuing
influx of agriculture workers from Mexico, produces the trailing level of socio-economic
status among Hispanics measured by citywide averages).
60. Peter A. Morrison, Demographic Analysis of Santa Maria, California, Expert
Report prepared for Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria 1 (Dec. 24, 1993) ("Demographic and
socioeconomic differences between Hispanics and non-Hispanics predispose lower
political participation by Hispanics.").
61. Id.
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D) Concentrating non-citizens in jurisdictions exacerbates the
disparities in voter participation.62 In response, the argument
is posed that voter participation is more an issue of
candidates and issues than any predisposition to vote.63
E) Latinos are not demographically homogeneous given the
regional differences in the countries of origin.64 In response,
the argument is posed that Latinos are no more
homogeneous or heterogeneous as a group than African
Americans, Democrats, or southerners.65
F) Voting differences between Latinos in the inner city and
suburbs, illustrate lack of political cohesion.66 In response,
the argument is made that political cohesion is a measure of
willingness to vote for a candidate of their choice for a
proposed single member district, not the city as a whole.67
G) Comparisons of Hispanics to non-Hispanics are
inappropriate since the non-Hispanic category includes other
protected minorities.68 In response, the argument is posed
that this is a fair comparison for some purposes. In other
cases, the fair comparison should be between Hispanics and
White, non-Hispanics.69
H) Finally, the persisting "lingering effects" of discrimination
decline and dissipate with the mortality and out-migration of
affected persons.70 In response, the argument is made that
discriminatory effects have multiplier effects and
generational effects and thus, do not always dissipate with
mortality of individuals directly affected, e.g., the Holocaust,
etc.
71
On the surface, the use of demographic rationale to argue against
expanding minority voter rights appear reasonable enough on the
surface, but all are based on flawed assumptions, research, and logic.
62. kl
63. Estrada, supra note 58.
64. Morrison, supra note 59.
65. Estrada, supra note 58.
66. Morrison, supra note 60.
67. Estrada, supra note 58.
68. Id.
69. Id
70. Peter A. Morrison, Estimating Depletion of a Latino Population Encountering
Hypothetical Discrimination in 1950 in Santa Maria, Appendix A to Surreply to Dr.
Camarillo's Supplementary Report ofAugust 13,2000, Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria (Sept. 3,
2000).
71. Estrada, supra note 58.
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DEMOGRAPHIC ISSUES ARISING FROM THE 2000 CENSUS
The authors omitted from their discussion an important data
issue arising from the 2000 census. The issue is how demographers
and researchers will deal with the new race categories from the 2000
census that allowed multiple responses to the race question. The
Public Law number 94-171 technical documentation lists 296 possible
categories of race and one can foresee demographic chaos if the civil
rights community does not agree upon some accepted standards in
the use of this data. 2
SOLUTIONS
In the final section of the paper, Farrell and Johnson provide
several solutions. The first is to develop collaborative strategies in
order to reduce tensions created by demographic change. I heartily
agree, and will only add that one can engage in collaboration
voluntarily or by force. In some cases, demographic changes in the
constituency may force African-American elected officials into
collaborative strategies. This is a welcome opportunity for cross-
ethnic coalition building.
CONCLUSION
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was created as a tool aimed at
eliminating discriminatory practices against African Americans by
whites in the southern states. Over time, the VRA has been amended
in recognition of issues such as language barriers to voting. As the
VRA was expanded to other parts of the nation, the distinct
demographic composition-multi-ethnic and multi-cultural-in many
areas posed a challenge to the VRA because current law provides no
incentives for cross-ethnic civil rights solutions.
African Americans, Latinos, and Asians differ among themselves
in the consistency of their self-identification, political participation,
intra-group unity, abilities to organize voters, and single party
affiliation. Despite this, major minority groups in the United States
share substantial common ground. Countless examples exist of the
willingness to build coalitions and work together to increase the
representation of elected officials who will work to improve the
conditions of all members of the community. The VRA works to
72. One illustration of how to use these multiple race categories is found in John
Hedderson, Proposed Race/Ethnicity Categories for PL 94-171 Data in the Redistricting
Database, Report to the Los Angeles County Boundary Review Committee, Walter R.
McDonald & Associates, May 2001.
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create control over a district by one racial or ethnic group but does
not encourage bi-racial or multi-racial or multi-ethnic influence
districts. The new demographics of our nation will surely put the
premises of the VRA to a test in the years to come.
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